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Abstract The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it reappraises themajor transforma-
tions which the utilitarian approach to human behavior has undergone in economics in
search for a representation by utility functions and later by preference orders. Second,
in the light of today’s behavioral and human sciences, an attempt is made to restore
some elements of early utilitarianism that were abandoned in these transformations.
Third, in line with the interest of the early utilitarians in both explaining behavior and
elaborating on its moral assessment, the present paper also discusses some normative
implications of the suggested restoration of utilitarian theory.
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1 Introduction
In the early days of utilitarianism, utility was given a very concrete, sensory interpre-
tation. This was the basis for explaining the reasons of human action and for deriving
by implication what a ‘good life’ means. The result was a positive theory and a related
normative discourse. Today this is different. Over the two centuries since its existence,
the utilitarian approach has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis. If students of eco-
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nomics nowadays are introduced to the concept of ‘utility’, the sensory underpinnings
and the connectionwithmoral philosophy are almost entirelymissing. Starting point is
now an axiomatic theory of preferences from which a purely formal notion of ‘utility’
is logically deduced (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995). It is the notion of an abstract
magnitude, an index number, of which nobody seems to know what kind of psychic
experience it represents. And utilitarian moral philosophy has adjusted to the language
of subjective “preference orderings” in place of sensory perceptions and their hedonic
quality (see, e.g. Sen 1987).
Outside economics, by contrast, a very different development took place. In the
behavioral and human sciences, many material hypotheses about human behavior and
its underlying motivations have been launched over the last decades—several of them
in a remarkably similar spirit as the utilitarian conjectures that have been abandoned in
economics. The evolutionary paradigm can be argued to offer an overarching frame-
work able to organize the vast body of knowledge that has been accumulated about
the motivations of human behavior (Burnham et al. 2016). In this paper, some of these
developments will be reviewed with the intention to show how a behavioral theory of
utility can be formulated on this basis, a theory that rehabilitates in part the explanatory
and normative impetus of early utilitarianism.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes basic views held in early
utilitarianism and outlines the major transformations by which the approach was suc-
cessively changed in economics into an abstract theory of choice behavior. Section 3
discusses a few attempts in economics that revived some elements of the early utilitar-
ian approach or even its very sensory foundations, albeit with little impact on presently
taught utility theory. Section 4 then reviews elements of a theory of action motivation
developed in biology, the behavioral science, and psychology. They are relevant for
a behavioral re-interpretation of utility theory, a re-interpretation that will turn out to
restore the original utilitarian program in important respects. Section 5 addresses the
normative question. This question resurfaces since the suggested re-interpretation of
utility theory seems to impose limitations on what a ‘good life’ may, or may not, mean.
Section 6 offers some tentative conclusions.
2 The early utilitarian program and its successive transformation
In 1789 Bentham published his “Principles of Morals and Legislation” (Bentham
1948). With its blending of a positive theory of action and a normative theory of
justice it became the authoritative statement of the early utilitarian program. In his
book the synonym for “utility”—a term which Bentham had taken over from Hume—
is “happiness”. This points to the hedonistic underpinnings by which Benthamwanted
to make the concept ‘operational’: “what happiness consists of we have already seen:
enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains” (ibid., p. 70). Consequently, Bentham
focused on the magnitude of pleasures and pains generated by someone’s action or
by a “sanction” imposed on someone by other agents or by nature. Human action
is intentional and motivated by the action’s consequences in terms of pleasures and
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the avoidance of pains (ibid., Chaps. VII and X).1 With remarkable psychological
intuition Bentham argued that the pleasures and pains—and, hence, the motivation
to take action—vary, in turn, with their intensity, duration, certainty, and nearness in
time. He expanded on a detailed enumeration of fourteen different sorts of pleasures
and twelve different sorts of pains which are, in turn, subdivided further (ibid., Chap.
V). Moreover, he argued that each of them can be sensed differently depending on yet
another, long list of diverse circumstances which he extensively commented on (ibid.,
Chap. VI).
From today’s point of view, the different sorts of categories given by Bentham refer
to quite a mixed bag of sensory perceptions, innate as well as learned responses, and
complex contingencies. However, the basic ideas are quite modern.
(i) Utility is interpreted as a hedonic experience generated by the pleasurable or
painful sensory perceptions resulting from an action like, e.g., the consumption
of a commodity. Utility is thus an attribute of actions not of objects.
(ii) The utility that an action, the consumption of a good, say, generates can be caused
by several different pleasures (or pains avoided) simultaneously.
(iii) As a sensory perception, utility is considered an observable and measurable mag-
nitude.
With respect to the last point and the concrete measurement of utility, Bentham
believed that pleasures and pains can be quantified, added up, and balanced—pleasures
with positive values, pains with negative values (ibid. Chap. IV). With such an
understanding it may appear only a small step to inter-personal comparisons of the
magnitudes of pleasures and pains. Indeed, Bentham assumed that an outside spectator
observing someone who enjoys pleasures or suffers pains can attribute money equiv-
alents to the strength of the observed person’s sensory experience. Once quantified
in ‘objective’ pecuniary terms, the utility of different agents can be added up and/or
balanced. By striking a balance Bentham wanted to determine the moral justification
of institutions like penal law or constitutions or individual actions. He considered
an institution or action morally right (wrong), if the balance is positive (negative).
Where the balance has its greatest positive value, the morally best solution is found—
Bentham’s “greatest happiness principle”. Such inter-personal comparisons of utility
involve (hidden) value judgements from which morally rather odd implications can
follow. 2
As far as the positive part of Bentham’s sensory utilitarianism is concerned, his
assumption (iii)—that utility, more precisely the magnitude of pleasures and pains,
1 In addition, Bentham held that the motivation for an action is also affected by “its fecundity, or the chance
it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind...” and “its purity, i.e. the chance it has of not being
followed by sensations of the opposite kind...” (ibid., p. 30).
2 The outcome of inter-personal utility comparisons rests on how the money equivalents attributed to
the individuals’ pleasures and pains are weighed. Are equal weights to be used for the different agents
or differing ones—a question requiring another value judgement. In the first case, Bentham’s “hedonic
calculus” could, for instance, result in moral justification for a sadist’s torturing of an innocent victim: both
equally weighed, the money equivalent of the sadist’s pleasures from malevolence can exceed the money
equivalent of the pains of the victim. If differing weights were assigned to different motives and/or different
pleasures/pains, this would mean taking recourse to non-utilitarian ethical considerations—something the
early utilitarians certainly did not have in mind.
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can indeed bemeasured and observed—is one thing. (The early utilitarians took this so
much for granted that they did not even think of possible procedures of observation or
measurement.) That outside spectators can attribute money values to someone else’s
sensory experience—thus creating a basis for inter-personal comparisons—is another
thing. Since pleasures and pains are sensory perceptions, the former idea does not seem
implausible. It has later been suggested that the Weber-Fechner law and the empirical
measuring of sensory perceptions on which the law is based could provide both the
foundation and the empirical method for utility measurement (see Stigler 1950, part
II).
The metamorphosis of Bentham’s formulation of utility theory started with Jevons’
“Theory of Political Economy” of 1871 (Jevons 1879). Jevons took over Bentham’s
pleasure-and-pain rhetoric, but his intentions were different ones. He aimed at a math-
ematical formulation of utility theory, a “calculus of pleasure and pain”, inspired by
the calculus used in classical mechanics (see Mirowski 1988, Chap. 1). In classical
mechanics—the then prevailing ideal of scientific analysis—laws are expressed in
single functional relationships. They can be subjected to differential calculus and the
corresponding extreme value analysis. Jevons’ project of constructing a corresponding
“mechanics of utility and self-interest” (ibid., p. 23) aimed at a theory that “...consists
in applying the differential calculus to the familiar notions of wealth, utility, value,
demand, supply, capital, interest labor, and all the other quantitative notions belonging
to the daily operations of industry. As the complete theory of almost every other sci-
ence involves the use of that calculus, so we cannot have a true theory of Economics
without its aid.” (ibid., pp. 4–5).
As Warke (2000) has argued, with its elaborate, naturalistic catalogue of pleasures,
pains, sensibilities, and circumstances, Bentham’s interpretation was too complex for
such a project. Jevons therefore introduced the following simplifications.
(i*) Unlike Bentham, he attributed “utility” not to actions (e.g., the act of consuming
a certain quantity of a commodity) but to the commodities themselves and their
quantities (Jevons 1879, pp. 40-2, 46-7).
(ii*) Where for Bentham an action (consuming a certain quantity of a commodity,
say) can cause the simultaneous enjoyment of several pleasures, Jevons shunned
the discussion of the plurality of causes by arguing that utility is a not further
differentiated, compound “feeling”. He represents it in his calculus by a one-
dimensional variable “u” (ibid., pp. 8-15).
(iii*) Jevons abandoned Bentham’s conceptualization of utility as an objectively mea-
surable magnitude. He postulates instead that the compound “feeling” belongs
to the subjective sphere of the decision maker which he considers “inscrutable”.
(ibid., pp. 15-7).
Of these modifications, the subjectivist creed (iii*) is the most widely recognized
one. Jevons claims that “every mind is .. inscrutable to every other mind, and no
common denominator of feeling seems possible” (ibid., p. 15). However, the other,
more subtle, modifications have significant consequences for the revision of utilitar-
ianism, too. When Bentham’s divers causes and contingencies of utility are replaced
by an undifferentiated, unobservable “feeling” (modification (ii*)), it is difficult, if not
impossible, to explain how utility as a motivation for taking action relates to motiva-
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tions like wants, needs, or desires. These constructs play a role in the behavioral and
human sciences. Jevons’ modification creates obstacles for a dialogue with these sci-
ences. His move also hampers the normative discourse within utilitarianism where the
interpretation of utility in terms of desires and their fulfilment still figures prominently
(see, e.g., Hare 1982). 3
Modification (i*)—attributing utility to quantities of commodities rather than the
action of consuming them—is conducive to the use of marginal calculus. Its con-
sequence is, first, that by replacing actions by quantities of commodities the time
dimension can be left out of the calculus.While actions like, e.g., consumption develop
their consequences over time, quantities of commodities do not necessarily have an
intrinsic time dimension – which makes a static marginal calculus feasible. Second,
when utility is attributed to actions, (expected) utility hinges on the agents’ knowledge
of means-ends relationships. By attributing utility directly to commodities these con-
tingencies of instrumental knowledge and the uncertainty they involve need no longer
be made explicit in the utility assessment.4 From the point of view of a normative
theory, the major effect of replacing actions by commodity quantities is that the latter,
unlike the former, have no moral connotations. Jevons’ substitution thus eliminates
the common basis of the positive utilitarian theory of action and the normative util-
itarian theory of the actions’ consequences. Subtle as the modification may appear,
it may have contributed to an increasing alienation of the positive branch of modern
utilitarianism from its origins in moral philosophy.
The development after Jevons focused onworking out and refining themathematical
details of utility calculus. In the beginning twntieth century, writers like Edgeworth,
Fisher, andParetowrestledwith the problemoffinding a representation of utility theory
(or of what calculus had left over of it) in terms of a proper utility function. From the
1930s onwards, the transition from cardinal to ordinal notions of utility prepared the
ground for further “progression in mathematical thought” (Samuelson 1947, p. 92).
The problem was that the few empirical conjectures that the revised utility theory
entails (decreasing marginal rates of substitution; the law of indifference implying
a downward sloping demand curve) all hinge on the shape of the utility function.
Yet, it was not clear what form of functions would be appropriate for expressing these
conjectures in a consistent way, not to speak of whether well-behaved functional forms
would conform to the empirical record of choice behavior.
One approach to solving that problem, suggested by Hicks and Allen (1934), was
to deduce implications of the theory that should be observable at the level of market
3 The fact that utility derived from an action can have multiple causes does not exclude its representation
by a one-dimensional variable. Recent research in the neurosciences has shown that in the assessment of
choice alternatives, different sources of reward can be associated with the alternatives. The brain is able
to spontaneously aggregate the different dimensions of reward in terms of one common ‘neural currency’
into a one-dimensional utility variable (see Glimcher 2016). A different question is, of course, how many
different, multi-dimensional stimuli the brain is able to process at a time, see Witt and Binder (2013) for a
discussion.
4 By conditioning utility by “understanding” and “consciousness”, Bentham (1948, Chap. VII) had been
eager to emphasize the knowledge-based, cognitive and social contingencies in enjoying pleasures or avoid-
ing pains. As will turn out below, these contingencies are important for understanding how preferences are
formed through learning processes at both the sensory and the cognitive level.
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demand curves, i.e. to derive, or rationalize, the law of demand. Utility theory is in this
way transformed into a building bloc of price theory. A different approach, namely
a logical reduction of utility theory to a theory of subjective preference orderings,
was suggested by Samuelson (1938). In the positivist spirit of the time, the theory of
revealed preferences, as he called it, was supposed to rely exclusively on operational
terms—prices, quantities, and income—and a postulate of consistent choice behavior
(the “weak axiom of revealed preference”). The theory should be logically equivalent
to ordinal utility theory. It should therefore allow to deduce well-behaved demand
functions without recourse to the utility concept. 5 Moreover, by the preference reve-
lation method that it implied, the theory should be able to empirically reconstruct the
individual indifference curves on which ordinal utility theory relied.
Attractive as Samuelson’s theory appeared, it turned out to be neither as logically
conclusive nor as powerful an empirical device as claimed. The consistency of choice
behavior—whether in the weak or the strong versions of the axiom of revealed pref-
erence – is an empirical conjecture. However, the empirical validity of the hypothesis
can only be proved by means of exactly the same observations that Samuelson’s pro-
cedure requires for reconstructing the individual preferences. Hence, whether or not
the empirically revealed preferences are correctly derived hinges on whether or not
one believes in the consistency of the individuals’ choice behavior. For this belief
no independent evidence can be provided—a logical indeterminacy (cf. Georgescu-
Roegen 1954a, Wong 1978, Chap. 4, 5). It made Sen (1973) wonder whether revealed
preference theory represents more than an “elaborate pun”. 6
While the theory of revealed preference did not gain much momentum as an empir-
ical program, its impact on microeconomic theory can hardly be underrated (see,
e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995). It fostered a rigorous, abstract approach based only on
the axioms of reflexivity, completeness, and transitivity. (The desired shape of logi-
cally implied utility functions and unique solutions in comparative statics analysis of
budget changes also require the more technical assumptions or axioms of continuity,
convexity, and non-satiation of preferences.) Given that all the axioms are highly ide-
alized assumptions, the relevance of this theory for empirical work is controversial
(Kreuzenkamp and Barten 1995). The theoretical rigor comes at a cost: utility theory
has lost significantly in terms of its empirical content.
3 Partial reversals and the connections to other motivation theories
Over the past decades, attempts have been made to broaden the theory again or even
to revoke some of the transformations. They gained a certain attention but did not
5 As later shown by Houthakker (1950), revealed preference theory is indeed observationally equivalent
to ordinal utility theory, if the consumers’ preferences are transitive (i.e. if the “strong axiom of revealed
preference” holds).
6 Originally envisaged tests of the theory by market data were not conducted. Some attempts were made
to examine it in experiments, yet with rather inconclusive results, see, e.g., Koo (1963), MacCrimmon
and Toda (1969), Koo and Hasenkamp (1972). Besides the consistency problem, the static framework of
revealed preference theory ignores that individual preferences can change during, or even as a consequence
of, the revelation procedure, a criticism already raised by Robinson (1962, p. 50).
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develop a major impact on textbook utility theory. These attempts were in part driven
by the elaboration of econometric aggregate demand theory, a huge literature of its
own omitted here for space reasons. 7 In part, however, the utility theory itself was the
object of change. An example for attempts to broaden the narrow theory is Lancaster’s
(1966; 1971) “characteristics approach”. Lancaster assumes that consumers derive
utility from the “characteristics” or intrinsic quality features of the goods rather than
from the goods as such. He introduces an ordinal utility function that has standard
properties except that, as arguments of the function, the quantities of goods are replaced
by a vector representing the quantities of characteristics which the goods possess.
For example, the characteristics of a wrist watch are its color, its form and size, the
number and specification of mechanical complications, the quality and weight of
the various materials of which it is manufactured, and so on. Under the simplifying
assumption that only one good is involved in each consumption activity (like the
wrist watch in measuring the time), the consumption technology can be described as
a linear transformation of the commodity space into the characteristics space. The
consumption technology is assumed to be ‘objectively’ known to all consumers.
Lancaster’s approach has the merit of drawing attention to the largely neglected,
but economically significant, quality dimension of goods and services (Wadman 2000,
Chap. 6). Except for this extension, however, his approach is firmly grounded in
assumptions (i*)–(iii*) that Jevons introduced. In contrast, an attempt to reverse amod-
ification introduced by Jevons—namely assumption (i*) by which utility is attributed
to quantities of commodities rather than actions—is made in Becker’s theory of the
allocation of time and his household production theory (Becker 1965, see alsoMichael
andBecker 1973). Becker argues that households obtain utility from “productive activ-
ities” in which purchased market goods and services are one sort of input and the
household’s time the other. The households’ activities are assumed to generate util-
ity via the produced “household commodities”. The latter enter a subjective utility
function with standard features. Households maximize their utility function subject
to given prices and marginal productivities of the inputs, an income constraint, and
a time constraint. 8 The consequence of replacing market commodities by household
commodities via an analysis of household activities is that the time dimension is back
as a crucial aspect of how utility is generated. Accordingly, alternative uses of time –
i.e. decisions between alternative household activities which cannot be conducted at
the same time—are the key feature of Becker’s theory and its applications.
7 See the literature on linear expenditure systems (Stone 1954) and distributed lags in consumption time
series (interpreted as “habit formation”, see Houthakker and Taylor 1966). The statistical approach devel-
oped in these contributions was only loosely informed by utility theory. The “almost ideal demand system”
proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) tried to change this. The authors derived constraints from util-
ity theory for the demand systems that were subjected to empirical tests with aggregate data. Due to too
many degrees of freedom, a direct test of the underlying theory turned out not be feasible in this way, ibid.,
Chap. 3.
8 As Steedman (2001, Chap. 2) has shown, the importance of time as an ultimate constraint and themarginal
conditions for maximizing utility over alternative uses of scarce time were clearly formulated by Gossen
as early as 1854. Steedman (ibid., Chap. 5) also makes clear that economizing on time cannot be framed
other than as a problem of choice between actions differing in their time intensity.
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In their already mentioned work under the programmatic title “Back to Bentham”,
Kahneman et al. (1997) go a step further. In the light of modern psychological research
they explain how the sensory perception of a hedonic experience arises from actions
(Bentham’s assumption (i)), and how it can be observed and measured (assumption
(iii)). They identify an immediate experience of outcomes (“instant utility”). Its values
correspond to Bentham’s variable “intensity”. Bentham’s variable “duration” turns out
to need a more differentiated representation. Kahneman et al. argue that the duration
of hedonic experience is assessed in retrospect. Only what is remembered can there-
fore count for the assessment of the stream of immediate experiences varying in their
intensity (“remembered utility”). However, they provide evidence that what is remem-
bered does not seem to reflect the whole stream. Remembered utility rather seems to
be represented by the average of the intensity of pleasures or pains at the peak of that
stream and near the end of it—which means that remembered utility is not affected
by the duration of the sensory experience. 9
By reversingmodification (i*) and (iii*), Kahneman et al. return to Bentham’s inter-
pretation of utility as a measurable, and perhaps inter-personally comparable, variable
(see Binder 2010 for a discussion). Yet, they still treat utility as a rather undiffer-
entiated “feeling” (Jevons assumption (ii*)). If one were to revoke this assumption
too, the plurality of pleasures caused by an action would be back on the screen—and,
accordingly, the motivating force which the expectation of these diverse pleasures has
for choosing the action. It can then be discussed, more specifically, how non-utilitarian
motivational theories of needs, wants, or desires relate to utility theory, and how they
may contribute to explaining what causes pleasurable sensory experiences. Such an
exercise can draw on theories of needs or wants which have a long, though today
neglected tradition in economics.
The concept of needs and drives—in the economic literature often epitomized by
the term “wants”—goes back at least to Plato. From the outset, it has been associated
with the idea of a hierarchal order or the “principle of the subordination of wants”
as Georgescu-Roegen (1954b) has called it. 10 The principle can be interpreted to
imply that, if a higher want always appears after a lower one has been satiated, an
individual’s total demand or consumption will never reach satiation. Until the 1960s,
a theory of wants or needs was frequently a part of explaining consumption behavior
(e.g., in Duesenberry 1949, Chap. 1; Abbott 1955, Chap. 4; and Ironmonger 1972).
In some cases it was explicitly combined with the utilitarian approach. An example
9 Kahneman et al. also reflect on normative implications, albeit in a way not comparable to the moral
ambitions of the early utilitarians (see also Kahneman 1994). When the assessment of a stream of sensory
experiences is left to the intuitive working of our memory, the result is “remembered utility”. Since this
does not fully represent the temporal profile of instant utility, one could claim that people better base their
assessment on the “total utility”, determined by the integral of the value of instant utility over time. However,
this would be a normative claim which people do not intuitively follow. Depending on how this normative
issue is decided, another (normative) question arises. Should people be forced—or at least be ‘nudged’—to
make use of total utility where they tend to rely on remembered utility?
10 During the so-called marginalist revolution in economics this non-utilitarian theory was favored by
Menger (1950, first edition 1871, Chap. 1). He argued that there is a demand for goods, because people
have needs and have learned that they can be satisfied by these goods. Menger (ibid., p. 131) assumed a
hierarchical structure as did Jevons—who called the assumption the “law of human wants” – although it
was not consistent with his own approach.
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is Georgescu-Roegen’s (1954b) comparison between axiomatic preference theory on
the one hand and the older literature on wants on the other—a remarkable antidote to
the positivist attitude of his time.
Georgescu-Roegen avoids a precise definition of wants. But the way he uses the
concept and, in particular, attributes indifference curves to wants makes it plain that an
action that serves the satisfaction of a specific want is considered an action that causes
a specific kind of utility. Since the consumers have a large, probably infinite, number
of wants, there are as many potential sources of pleasures. With his “principle of the
irreducibility of wants” Georgescu-Roegen claims that the multiplicity of wants (or
sources of utility) cannot be lumped into just one catch-all “want”. However, precisely
this has been done, he argues, “in a veiled passage” by “the founders of marginal utility
theory” with their concept of utility representing “the unique want into which all wants
can be merged” (ibid. p. 515). Obviously, Jevons’ modification (ii*) is attacked here,
and the vehicle Georgescu-Roegen suggests to overcome it is his theory of wants.
Georgescu-Roegen’s approachwas later taken up and varied by Ironmonger (1972).
Interested in consumer innovations he recognizes that “without some distinction
between various types of wants, there is no place for considering a change in the
quality of a commodity or the introduction of a new commodity to the market” (ibid.,
13). LikeGeorgescu-Roegen, Ironmonger acknowledges amultiplicity ofwantswhich
“...are assumed to be so ordered that at a given income and prices the consumer will
satiate as many wants as possible, going down the order of priority from the most
important to the least” (ibid., 23). But unlike Georgescu-Roegen he assumes that the
number of units of satisfaction of all these different wants can be merged to give a
homogeneous utility measure (see footnote 3 above). The measure induces a prefer-
ence order over wants rather than commodities. More precisely, Ironmonger argues
that because of the hierarchical order and the satiability of wants, the preference order
is lexicographic. He goes on, on this basis, to determine optimal budgets by means
of linear programming and to analyze, in the usual fashion, the comparative statics of
choice and the effects of quality differentiation and new commodities.
BothGeorgescu-Roegen and Ironmonger thus demonstrate how a theory ofwants—
even though they construct it ad hoc—can inspire material conjectures about the
sources of utility. The theory of motivation has, of course, been developed more sys-
tematically and much further in the behavioral and human sciences. A reappraisal of
the early utilitarian intuitions in terms of the present state of motivation theory can
therefore draw on a set of richer hypotheses in which needs, wants, and (cognitive)
desires or goals do play a role. The subject of the next section therefore is how these
hypotheses can be made use of for better understanding what causes utility und under
what conditions. In this way, utility theory can be integrated into the broader frame of
a naturalistic theory of human behavior—something called for in recent pleas for the
consilience of the sciences (see Wilson 1998, pp. 204–5).
4 A behavioral reappraisal of the utility and choice behavior
A straight forward starting point for discussing the reasons of action is to recognize
the influence the human genetic endowment. Not only the physical traits of a species
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are innate, i.e. heritable, but also an elementary (instinctive) behavior repertoire and
the basic learning mechanisms by which actual behavior adapts during a lifetime.
Following the working hypothesis of evolutionary biology, particularly sociobiology,
and evolutionary psychology, these inherited parts evolved most likely in ancestral
times when humans were under fierce selection pressure. Behavior that enabled an
advantage in accessing scarce resources like food, territory, status, mating partners
then resulted in differential reproductive success and was selected for. In the case
of humans, their emerging cognitive capacity is likely to have started influencing the
process of selection. This has been conjectured to havegiven rise to a “dual inheritance”
(Richerson and Boyd 2005), a cultural and a genetic one.
Regarding actionmotivation, the relevant feature of humanbehavior that seems to be
inherited from ancestral times is the role played by need deprivation. This is an elemen-
tary motivator of action and its reduction also the basis of reinforcement learning by
which the actions actually chosen are adapted to the environmental conditions. Regard-
ing the physiological needs such as those for water, sleep, food, adequate body temper-
ature, (a certain level of) physical activity, sex, etc. deprivation occurs as a consequence
of some physiological tension, deficiency, or imbalance. In the case of the need for
food, for instance, it is signaled by a feeling of hungerwhen the organism’smetabolism
lacks energy in the form of nutrition. A motivation to act (e.g., to engage in foraging
behavior) arises. The deprived state, and thus the motivation to act, vanishes when the
action(s) lead to satiation of the corresponding needs. However, when an action is able
to reduce deprivationwith respect to several needs simultaneously, amotivation to take
that action exists as long as satiation is not yet reachedwith respect to all relevant needs.
Deprivation also occurs andmotivates action in the case of innate needs shared only
by higher animals. Among these needs are the ones for arousal of the senses (or the
cognitive system), for social status recognition, and for care and affection. Moreover,
humans also share with the usual genetic variance specific cognitive needs such as
the need for autonomy (Hagger et al. 2006) and the need for a positive self-image or
self-esteem (Pyszczynski et al. 2004). In the utilitarian diction, need deprivation can
in all these cases be interpreted as a sensory perceptions classified by innate neural
processes as a form of pain. Its reduction is experienced as a relief from pain, a pleasant
experience.
While need deprivation causes the motivation to act, reinforcement learning and
conditioned reinforcement determined which actions come to be chosen as a result of
the deprivation. By reinforcement learning (operant conditioning) the relative frequen-
cies with which actions belonging to the behavioral repertoire are chosen are adapted
as follows. Suppose that initially, actions are selected at random. If they are expe-
rienced to reduce need deprivation—a rewarding sensory perception—their relative
frequency increases as long as deprivation is present or has reemerged. Conversely, an
action followed by a sensory perception of pain is not only discontinued, but alsomoti-
vates active avoidance behavior which, when successful in relieving pain, is reinforced
(Herrnstein 1990). 11
11 Apart from relief of pain, a reinforcing effect has been observed for actions reducing deprivation
with respect to innate needs such as the just mentioned ones. As innate or “primary” reinforcers they are
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Conditioned reinforcement (conditioning learning) is a different, but related process
(Leslie 1996, pp. 40-2). Imagine two actions. One of them triggers the rewarding sen-
sory perception of reducing deprivation of an innate needwhile the other action triggers
a neutral experience. Assume that over time both actions repeatedly coincide so that
an association is learned between the two. Once such an association is established,
the originally neutral action can result in a more or less rewarding instance in its
own right. A conditioned or “secondary” reinforcer is established that works even if
the previously coinciding primary reinforcement is dropped. The strength of a condi-
tioned reinforcer fades, however, if the association on which it is based is not at least
occasionally corroborated.
To distinguish it from innate needs let the motivational equivalent of secondary
reinforcers be dubbed acquired wants. Given the powerful associative capacity of the
human brain, an elaborate structure of acquired wants can emerge over an individ-
ual’s life time. Unlike the widely shared innate needs, this structure is idiosyncratic
and varies greatly between individuals. Nonetheless, the influence of an individual’s
cultural environment on what associations she happens to learn causes cultural contin-
gencies in the acquired wants. They tend to be more similar within similarly socialized
groups than between groups. With regard to the utilitarian program these considera-
tions suggest:
Hypothesis 1 Utility arises from the rewarding sensory perception associated with
actions that reduce deprivation of innate needs or that satisfy acquired wants.
This hypothesis is in accord with core assumptions of the original sensory util-
itarianism. In hedonistic terms, the rewarding sensory perception is a pleasurable
experience (“instant utility” in Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin’s terminology). It is
connected to a variety of innate needs and acquired wants. As a sensory perception it
is measurable in principle.
Turning to the explanation of the actual choice behavior, the motivation to act is
often induced by different needs and/or wants simultaneously which can be deprived
to different degrees. The actions available usually differ with respect to the extent to
which they allow the rewarding experience of satisfying needs/wants. Hence there are
multiple trade-offs. The question arises which of the actions are more effective in pro-
viding rewarding experiences. Such a situation requires the organism to spontaneously
generate internal valuations of the available alternatives (Shizgal 1999, p. 509; seeWitt
and Binder 2013 for a discussion). They depend on the different degrees of depriva-
tion, on earlier experience with the actions’ relative capacity to reduce deprivation,
and on the current constraints. In the longer run, learning thus prompts an adaptation
to both prevailing resource constraints and the organism’s ‘comparative advantages’
in generating rewarding sensory perceptions by choosing particular actions rather than
other actions. The baseline behavior by which the double adaptation problem is solved
is governed by reinforcement learning. Hence:
Footnote 11 continued
commonly shared among humans, see Leslie (1996, Chap. 2). Note that need satisfaction is not the only
instance in which primary reinforcers occurs in a species, see Lea (1983).
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Hypothesis 2 For behavior not controlled by cognitive deliberation, the relative fre-
quencies with which alternative actions are chosen depend on two kinds of variables.
The first is the relative strength of deprivation of the various innate needs or of the
motivation triggered by the various acquired wants during the relevant period of time.
The second variable is the relative reward in terms of need orwant satisfaction resulting
on average from the particular actions chosen in the past.12
The hypothesis denotes themain determinants of utility (abstracting for themoment
from cognitive influences). These are the relative degree of deprivation the decision
maker is exposed to with respect to her several innate needs; the learned association
from which the acquired wants (conditioned reinforcers) derive their motivational
strength; the average efficacy of the decision maker in triggering rewarding sensory
perception by reducing need deprivation or satisfying acquiredwants with the different
available actions, given her constraints in time and resources. In relation to the last
determinant it should be noted already that there are significant differences between
the different innate needs in how the degree of their deprivation can be reduced when
the same amount of resources is spent on their satisfaction (a point to be taken up in
the next section).
In humans, the choice of actions is, of course, to a considerable extent involving
cognitive activity, particularly in the context of actions requiring larger outlays. When
cognition intervenes into making choices this can lead to modifications of the baseline
behavior discussed so far. For that reason, the explanation of both the motivation to act
and the way in which actions come to be chosen when a motivation to act exists has to
account for cognitive influences (see Bargh et al. 2010 for the following). Regarding
the motivation to act, cognitive activity can result in goal setting and a corresponding
goal striving as a motivational force of its own. The strength of this motivation to
act depends (among other things) on the decision maker’s strength of belief that an
accomplishment of the goal is feasible andonher persistence (a personality factor). The
accomplishment of the goal triggers a rewarding experience. Regarding the (adaptive)
choice of particular actions, deliberation in the form of cause-effect conjectures and/or
means-ends reflections can mediate the motivational force of deprived innate needs
and acquired wants. Moreover, cognitive learning by inference, by own memorized
experience, or by observing others (Bandura 1986, Chap. 2) can intervene into the
non-cognitive adaptation patterns determined by reinforcement learning according to
Hypothesis 2. For these reasons, it is necessary to add:
Hypothesis 3 Utility arises in addition from the rewarding experience associatedwith
success in goal striving. If cognitive activities intervene into choice behavior, the
relative frequencies with which alternative actions are chosen also depend on the
subjective content of deliberation and the decision maker’s strength of belief in it and
on her persistence.
12 Under laboratory condition it is possible to study the limiting case of one need in isolation whose degree
of deprivation is held at a constantly high level. Hence, the first kind of variables is artificially held constant
here. In such a situation, the relative frequencies with which the available actions are chosen have been
found to be proportional to the average reward in terms of reducing need deprivation associated with the
actions—the “matching law”, see Herrnstein (1990).
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Thefirst part of this hypothesis poses no particular problem. In terms ofKahneman’s
et al. (1997) diction, the utility caused by the rewarding experience of success in
goal striving is still “instant utility”. However, in the process of cognitive learning
of how actions and utility are associated, the memorized experience takes the form
of “remember utility” and cognitive deliberation leads to “predicted utility”. The two
together form the basis of “decision utility”. Kahneman et al. emphasize that biases
in both predicted and remembered utility can systematically bias decision utility and
thus decision making.
The problem with the second part of Hypothesis 3 is that the subjective content
of deliberative activities is highly context-dependent and idiosyncratic. It may lead to
certain actions being delayed or chosen less frequently or being abandoned altogether,
while other actions may be chosen more frequently. The modifying effect on the fre-
quency distribution over actions that would result from the not cognitively controlled
baseline behavior is therefore difficult to predict in generic terms. 13 Cultural influences
may, however, constrain in inter-personally similar ways the set of actions individually
taken into account when there is a motivation to act and may bias the expectations
regarding the outcome of the actions. This is a consequence, for example, of shared
mental models often observed to exist within intensely communicating groups.
5 Motivational treadmills and the resurfacing of the moral dimension
As mentioned at the beginning, Bentham’s sensory utilitarianism was inspired by the
twin idea of explaining the motivation underlying human behavior and of assessing
its moral legitimacy—both to be accomplished simultaneously on the basis of his
theory of happiness or utility. The question can therefore be raised what normative
implications the behavioral perspective on utility and choice behavior summarized
by the Hypotheses 1–3 may have. This question will now be addressed. As will turn
out, its discussion is not affected by limitations due to the subjectivity of cognitive
influences on behavior.
In a longer run perspective, adaptation of behavior by cognitive and non-cognitive
learning is a constituent part of the process of cultural evolution. This process is
empowered, and has been strongly accelerated over the past two centuries, by the
huge increases in human productivity and per capita income—in short: by economic
growth. The process has not left unaffected the vision of what happiness and a ‘good
life’ mean. It gives reason to reconsider the moral appeal of these utilitarian notions
in the light of the rapid development of modern economies.
Economic growth ultimately serves the end of a greater individual command of
resources to satisfy the individuals’ innate needs, acquired wants, and cognitive goals.
In the more recent past, the activities thus motivated have brought about an expansion
of the human niche and a more intense exploitation of nature. Even though the multi-
faceted cultural evolution has not always been functional to this end (see, e.g.,Diamond
13 This is a reason for why decision subjectivism, which has a long tradition particularly in Austrian
Economics, has a certain justification, seeWagner (2010) for a discussion. Attempts to explain the historical
choices of a single decision maker therefore often resort to a reconstruction by means of “situational logic”
as described by Popper (1960, Chap. 31).
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1997), economic growth that was made possible has eased the burden of poverty,
drudgery, and malady for the human kind. This means that, on average, there is less
deprivation of needs and a greater capacity for satisfying acquired wants (of which
there is an increasing number) and accomplishing cognitive goals. In utilitarian terms,
it is now possible to enjoy more pleasures and better be protected against suffering
pains, i.e. reach a higher level of utility. Can it be expected that a continued economic
growth will continue improving what is a ‘good life’ already?
There are certainly countries and people still suffering from a significant extent of
poverty, drudgery, and malady for which economic growth would fulfill that expecta-
tion. But this fact only points to the necessity of paying attention to the level of income
already reached when the question of further improvements is discussed. Once the
income level is sufficiently high, other aims than overcoming poverty, drudgery, and
malady seem to gain importance for what happiness and a ‘good life’ mean. For under-
standing these changes and their normative relevance it is useful to inquire in more
detail into how the various motivational forces change with the resources available for
their satisfaction.
Let us discuss this for the innate needs first. With a strongly increasing income it
becomes feasible to reduce or even eliminate deprivation of several innate needs. (An
obvious example is the need for food). The motivation to spend additional income
on goods serving such needs declines comparatively quickly. By the same token, the
additional instant utility that can be realized if consumption of such goods is expanded
vanishes. However, there are also innate needs for which this does not seem to be the
case. They are likely to cause a constantly upheld motivation to spend on their behalf
when income grows further. Does this also imply that the expanding consumption of
goods serving such needs continues to raise utility?
Consider the need for social status recognition that was mentioned above. If this
need is deprived, a motivation to act emerges. A straightforward action available for
trying to reduce deprivation is to buy goods that are supposed to have the property of
signaling the desired status. Social status tends to be correlateswith income, yet income
is not directly observable. For that reason, the price of status symbols signaling the
size of income is usually increasing with the average income in the respective social
stratum. The purpose of associating oneself by accordingly priced status symbols
with the social stratum one wishes to belong to (and/or the distinguishing oneself
from groups with lower status) is to reduce deprivation in status recognition. Yet, with
rising average income, lower income groups can sooner or later also afford such status
symbols. As a consequence, the status-distinguishing character of the corresponding
goods is lost and the intended need deprivation does not materialize or does not last. To
continue to be able to signal the desired social status, other, usually more expensive,
goods need to be consumed. This is an unstable situation (Hirsch 1978; Frank 2007,
2011)—a kind of motivational treadmill: If income is secularly rising, the motivation
to act is constantly upheld. This leads to ever more expenditures on status symbols, but
on average everyone just stays put in her status. This means that the intended reduction
of deprivation can at best be realized transitorily. A possible utility gain derived by
spending ever more is short-lived, if there is any at all.
Another example for an innate needs for which expenditures rising with the growth
of income do not reduce deprivation in lasting ways is the need for sensory and
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cognitive arousal. As already suggested by Scitovsky (1976), the reason is again an
instability albeit one that differs from that of social status races. Need deprivation is
reduced in this case through experiencing sufficiently arousing stimuli. If the need
is deprived there is thus a motivation to spend on getting such stimuli. However,
what is sensed as sufficiently arousing is subject to hedonic adaptation (Frederick
and Loewenstein 1999). This adaptation effect tends to depreciate the arousal value
triggered by the repeated experience of the same stimulus. Deprivation returns as does
the motivation to reduce it. However, eliciting sufficiently high levels of arousal again
requires different and/or stronger stimuli. They usually result in higher expenditures—
just to find out that sooner or later hedonic adaptation destroys the utility gains again.
Another round of this motivational treadmill begins. 14
These examples of motivational treadmills seem to challenge the idea that a vision
of happiness and a ‘good life’ could be specified independently of the level of income
and opportunities reached in an economy. Once those needs that can be satiated by
spending more on them have been satisfied, further rising income is increasingly spent
on needs implyingmotivational treadmills.What is enjoyed then as pleasures are often
only transitory enjoyments calling for being renewed by raising the corresponding
expenditures ever more.
A motivational treadmill effect also occurs in the context of acquired wants and
cognitive goal setting. The reason are the unlimited opportunities for a socially contin-
gent learning of new wants and goals, following fashions and fads. Due to attentional
limitations, newly learned wants and goals tend to replace previously pursued ones
(which tend to be unlearned). As a consequence, the pleasures enjoyed are pleasures
that had to be learned or thought up first, before they generated utility. But as with all
learning there is a peculiar asymmetry. Had there been no continued income increases,
no opportunities would have occurred to experience all the new action opportunities
and to learn to appreciate them. None of the newly learned enjoyments of pleasures
would be missed if the learning had not taken place. Once all the experience have been
made, though, foregoing all the learned pleasures, e.g. because of a sustained decline
in disposable income, would be felt as a harsh deprivation. Put differently, had the
‘better life’ that a higher income allows never been experienced, it would not have
been known to be better than the ‘good life’ defined with respect to the present income
level. Although this is hypothetical reasoning, a utilitarian should be concerned about
its implications. They entail a rather relativistic assessment of the ‘good’ in the notion
of a ‘good life’.
Moreover, questions of moral legitimation may arise. The modern version of the
utilitarian program (or what is left of it) uses preference subjectivism as an argument
not to engage in a discourse on the different motivations underlying choice behav-
ior. With this argument such questions can be ignored. However, in the behavioral
reinterpretation of the utilitarian program outlined here they cannot be ignored. Is
additional income spent in pursuit of a motivational treadmill equally justified from
14 The consequences of this can be conjectured to express themselves in the consumption of consumer
electronics, entertainment, tourism, and the social media. At the national level, expenditures motivated this
way have been growing much faster with rising income than average consumption expenditures and are
likely to continue to do so.
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a utilitarian point of view as additional income spent on needs where deprivation can
definitely be removed as in the case of true poverty, drudgery, and malady? Is addi-
tional income spent to obtain rewarding sensory perceptions from reducing deprivation
in innate needs equally morally legitimate as additional spending to obtain rewarding
experiences from acquired wants or accomplishment of cognitive goals? If, as in the
hedonistic tradition, the moral measuring rod is the contribution to individual happi-
ness, at least with respect to the motivational treadmill cases doubts seem warranted.
6 Conclusions
Since its inception, the utilitarian approach to explaining economic behavior has been
subject to a radical transformation. The original, naturalistic interpretation laid out
by Bentham was gradually turned into an abstract theory of preferences. Following a
brief review of the early utilitarian program based on hedonistic conjectures about the
motivation of human behavior this paper has highlighted some major modifications
of that program. It has been argued that they resulted in a significant loss of material
conjectures and, hence, explanatory potential regarding economic behavior. As dis-
cussed, this loss has recently led to a few attempts to extend the empirical basis of
utility theory again and to revoke some of the modifications. Taking up this impulse,
the paper has tried to reappraise core elements of sensory utilitarianism and to relate
them to a more general motivational theory based on insights from today’s behavioral
and human sciences. However, the aim of this endeavor was not only to obtain a richer
theoretical foundation. As the early utilitarians were interested in both explaining
behavior and elaborating on its moral assessment, the present paper has also explored
some normative implications of the suggested behavioral restatement of utility theory.
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